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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  Icelandic  banking  crisis  provides  a  useful  example  of how  the  global  economic  downturn  transformed
into  a domestic  crisis  and  then  transformed  again  into  an  international  conflict.  Rather  than  a  strict
economic  analysis,  discussion  around  the  economic  causes  and  potential  cures  surrounding  the  Icelandic
banking  crisis  have  been  framed  in  terms  of  ethics.  The  analysis  shows  that  ethical  paradigms  based  on
consequences,  in  line  with  Kant’s  hypothetical  imperative,  do not  align  well  with  categorical  imperatives
based  on  duty  when  considering  international  political  conflicts.  It is  unclear  that  any  accounting  would
have  the  potential  to achieve  reconciliation.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
During the recent global economic downturn, several localized
crises have emerged. The risk of sovereign debt default has arisen
in Greece and other parts of Europe, bank failures have struck the
United States and Ireland among others and civil unrest has been
seen in Europe, Asia and other parts of the world. Many aspects of
these crises signal contagion, cross-border spillover and interna-
tional dispute. The case of Iceland provides a marked example of
how the global economic downturn first transformed into a domes-
tic crisis and then into an international conflict.
Iceland’s banking crisis centered on the failure of the coun-
try’s three large commercial banks in late 2008. In spite of the
size of Iceland, with just over 300,000 citizens, the crisis there has
had significant international consequences. In the words of one
analyst, “Iceland experienced the deepest and most rapid finan-
cial crisis recorded in peacetime” (Danielsson, 2009, p. 9). The
Icelandic crisis has been significant for not only Iceland itself, but
as a microcosm of the sources of economic problems elsewhere. As
another analysis concludes, “the repercussions on both the coun-
try’s native Icelanders as well as global financial markets give
reason to dedicate serious attention to the causes and cures, of
this unfortunate and wholly avoidable event” (Bagus and Howden,
2009, np).
Discussion around the economic causes and potential cures sur-
rounding the Icelandic banking crisis has been framed in terms of
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ethics. Icelanders facing the costs of repaying depositors, the cit-
izens of other countries who  have lost their deposits, politicians
across Europe and economists around the globe have reacted to the
crisis from an ethical stance. Exploring the variance among these
reactions can help build an understanding of how ethical paradigms
and international political economy interrelate.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first aim is to under-
stand better the broad role of ethics in international economic
affairs and the challenges faced when bringing ethical discuss-
ions into international political economy. The second aim is to
more narrowly analyze how ethical paradigms helped to shape
national and international reactions to the Icelandic banking cri-
sis. From the Icelandic banking crisis, the international conflict
that resulted was roundly pitted in terms of ethical standards,
but the two broad camps in this dispute each used different
rubrics. In this international banking dispute, the rubrics lead to
vastly different ethical conclusions. The analysis shows that ethical
paradigms based on consequences, in line with Kant’s hypothetical
imperative, do not align well with categorical imperatives based
on duty when considering international political conflicts. It is
unclear that any accounting would have the potential to achieve
reconciliation.
The remainder of this paper will first review the Kantian frame-
work of ethics. The following section considers the model of homo
economicus. The third section outlines the Icelandic banking cri-
sis within an international political economy context. Fourth is
a consideration of reactions to the crisis, followed by a section
that offers a comparison of the ethical frameworks that can be
found in the reactions to the crisis. Finally, some conclusions are
offered.
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2. The Kantian framework
Understanding the bases of ethical behavior is, of course, part
of a rich philosophical tradition. It is not the intent of this paper to
provide a review of that literature—the purpose is not to contribute
to the philosophical debate on ethics. Rather this paper focuses
on one particular ethical philosophy, that of Immanuel Kant. Kant
offers guidance on “the rule of behavior in regard to free choice”
(Lectures, 27:243). In Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785),
Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Metaphysics of Morals (1797), and
the collected Lectures on Ethics (1997), Kant outlines a philosophy
of ethics that distinguishes “inclination” from “duty.”
As Balleta and Bazin, 2005 note, references to Kant are not
new in economics. Kant’s theories play a role in economic analysis
from Laffont (1975),  Sen (1977),  Elster (1998) and Wolfelsperger
(1999), among others. However, as Ballet and Jolivet (2003) point
out, these types of references to Kant do not typically fully
consider Kantian ethics, especially the theory of the categorical
imperative.
Kant argues that acting morally only occurs when one sup-
presses his or her “inclination and instead acts according to duty”
(Lectures, 27:672). Moral acts are those that are done “out of respect
for the moral law” (Lectures, 27:727). An act is moral if it is done
because it is a duty to do so (Kelly, 2006). This is in contrast to any
acts done simply in accordance with duty.
The distinction here is not among the acts themselves, but
whether the motivation for those acts is from inclination or from
duty. Kant expresses this in terms of “good will”:
A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects,
not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but
simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself and
considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that
can be brought about by it in favor of any inclination, nay even
of the sum total of all inclinations. (Groundwork, 6: 394)
Thus, the dichotomy Kant proposes is between acts that are done
because of the morality of the act itself—out of a duty to accord with
moral law—and those that are done because of the consequences
or the effects of the act.
Inclination should not be conflated with desire (Wood, 2002).
One can desire to act out of duty for moral law. “So when Kant says
that the man  acts without inclination, this does not entail that he
acts without desire (which Kant, along with the rest of us, would
regard as certainly unappealing and perhaps even impossible)”
(Wood, 2002, p. 20).
Kant offers further exposition of this point in terms of what he
labels the “categorical imperative” versus the “hypothetical imper-
ative.” Categorical imperatives are the basis of moral law derived
from human rationality and free will. Categorical imperatives are
principles of behavior that are inherently moral. They are not good
because of their expected effects or consequences, but because they
are good in and of themselves. In the words of another theorist, this
ethical system is “based on the moral status of actions themselves,
rather than on their consequences, outcomes, or results . . . certain
actions are prescribed (or forbidden) as matters of duty, regard-
less of the consequences of the action (or inaction)” (White, 2004,
p. 92).
Further, acts are moral not simply when in accordance with
duty, but when done because of duty. Kant explains: “The cate-
gorical imperative would be that which represented an action as
necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objec-
tively necessary” (Groundwork, 6: 414). Categorical imperatives
should be adhered to in all situations, by all people and at all times.
Categorical imperatives, in this sense, are universal. Kant explains
the universal nature: “I ought never to act except in such a way
that I can also will that my  maxim should become universal law;”
and “act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never
merely as an end” (Groundwork, 4: 402 and 4: 429).
In contrast, hypothetical imperatives are not universal. These
imperatives are similarly borne out of human rationality, but only
within a specified goal and end one wish to achieve. Hypothetical
imperatives can be formed as conditional statements: if you wish
to achieve some effect in a particular situation, then perform this
act. In this way, hypothetical imperatives, unlike categorical imper-
atives, are based on the consequences of acts. “If now the action is
good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is
hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as
being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to
reason, then it is categorical” (Groundwork, 4: 414).
3. Homo economicus
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and in The Wealth of
Nations (1776) Adam Smith describes how economic behavior and
market efficiency are based in human motivation. In particular, for
Smith, self-interest is crucial in achieving optimal outcomes for
all. Self-interested economic motivation does not work against the
common good, in Smith’s account, but rather is the keystone of
common good. In Smith’s words, “It is not from the benevolence
of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner,
but from their regard to their own interest” (Smith, 2010, p. 27).
Building upon this idea, Milton Friedman (1976) stated, “Every
individual serves his own  private interest. . . The great Saints of
history have served their ‘private interest’ just as the most money
grubbing miser has served his interest” (p. 11). Similarly, Ludwig
von Mises (1949) stated, “The ultimate end of action is always the
satisfaction of some desires of the acting man” (p. 19).
This idea of self-interested human behavior has come to be
represented by the term homo economicus, representing human
decision-making in terms of economic calculations. One set of
economic theorists explains, “The standard view of economic
decision-making, embodied in the metaphorical figure of homo
economicus, is that agents choose options to maximize utility based
on stable, given preferences within constraints usually provided by
the market” (Montero and White, 2007, p. 144). Homo economicus
is thus a model of human behavior, especially of economic behavior,
that suggests that humans make decisions according to a utility-
maximizing cost benefit calculation from a set of preferences.
This model of human behavior has been a common tool for
analysis. White (2004) suggests, “This model has proven extremely
useful in helping us understand countless aspects and examples of
human behavior, from common business decisions to government
policy-making” (p. 89). At the same time, however, many have felt
uncomfortable with how well the model mirrors reality. In partic-
ular, Amartya Sen (1977) has pointed out the apparent absurdities
that can result from the model.
Others have expressed discomfort in the lack of choice that
might exist for homo economicus. Montero and White note many
economists have expressed that the calculative approach inherent
in the model takes much of the sense of choice out of behavior.
If one always acts in accordance with the calculated self-interest,
what choice of action is there? In this vein, Mark Lutz (1999) has
said that “economic choice takes the real choice out of economics”
(p. 155). Similarly, G.L.S. Shackle (1961) has argued that “conven-
tional economics is not about choice, but about acting according to
necessity” (p. 272).
Ethics has played a major role in these lines of critique. One
analyst posed the question directly: can the homo economicus be
reconciled with ethical imperatives (White, 2004)? The fundamen-
tal question is if calculations based on self-interest suggest that an

